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GENES AND DISABILITY:  
QUESTIONS AT THE CROSSROADS 
MARY CROSSLEY* & LOIS SHEPHERD** 
 The articles contained in this issue spring from papers presented 
at a conference that we had the privilege of hosting in March of 2002 
at the Florida State University College of Law. The conference, enti-
tled “Genes and Disability: Defining Health and the Goals of Medi-
cine,” was designed to elicit studied discussion of the relationship of 
genes to disability, genes to health, and genes to human well-being 
more generally. Assumptions about these relationships underlie 
nearly every legal and public policy decision relating to the subject of 
genetic medicine—from liability for negligent prenatal testing to 
statutory prohibitions of insurance discrimination on the basis of ge-
netic information. Yet how we look at genetic conditions and their re-
lationship to health and disability, or to notions of “normalcy” and 
“deviance,” is not strictly or even primarily a legal matter. Instead, 
the issues raised in this context involve ethical considerations and 
require an understanding of the social contexts in which those issues 
appear. For this reason we sought to include in the conference schol-
ars from a variety of fields of study. The result was the gathering of 
sixteen scholars from the disciplines of law, medicine, medical ethics, 
history, philosophy, religion, sociology, psychology, and anthropology. 
While the conference was designed to be multi-disciplinary, it placed 
some emphasis on how various ethical responses can or should be re-
flected in law. The following collection of articles brings the insights 
of other disciplines to urgent questions regarding how the law should 
respond to advances in genetic medicine. 
 When and why are certain genes “undesirable,” who decides, and 
how? When does that “undesirability” constitute a “disability” for the 
person who carries that gene and what are the implications of deem-
ing a genetic condition a disability? When does a genetic condition 
mean that a person or a person’s (potential) offspring is unhealthy 
and thus the appropriate object of medical attention? Should the 
medical response influence the legal response and, if so, how? These 
were the questions we posed at the outset to conference participants. 
                                                                                                                    
 * Florida Bar Health Law Section Professor of Law, Florida State University Col-
lege of Law.  
 ** Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law. The authors would 
like to thank Román Ortega-Cowan and the Law Review editorial staff for their valuable 
assistance in hosting the symposium and for their commitment to the production of this is-
sue.  
 xii
As would be expected from the diverse academic backgrounds of the 
speakers, the questions were addressed in a number of different con-
texts and from varying perspectives. In reading the final manuscripts 
produced by participants for this issue, we have identified two broad 
themes emerging from the combined works that we would like to 
highlight. The first relates to line-drawing, the second to the social 
nature of genetic information.  
 That the issue of line-drawing in the context of prenatal testing 
practices would receive prominent attention at the conference was 
anticipated by the very questions originally posed to participants. 
This highly debated issue might be stated as follows: given that it is 
possible to test for certain genetic conditions for the purposes of 
aborting affected fetuses or selecting against certain embryos in the 
context of in vitro fertilization, is it appropriate for health care pro-
fessionals to offer and society to support tests for only certain condi-
tions and not for others? Are some genetic conditions clearly so unde-
sirable that testing should always be offered (and perhaps encour-
aged)1 and some genetic conditions clearly so trivial that selection on 
the basis of them is inappropriate and should be discouraged or even 
unavailable? Testing for some conditions but not others, in particu-
lar, testing only for disabling conditions, risks harm to people cur-
rently living with disabilities by further stigmatizing impairment.2 It 
also potentially intrudes on reproductive choice to the extent that the 
mere existence of certain tests and not others suggests that a parent 
should want to avoid giving birth to a child with the disabling condi-
tion tested for.3 On the other hand, allowing parents to test and se-
lect for any trait, such as perfect musical pitch, risks commodifying 
children and weakening the parent-child relationship.4 Unrestricted 
choice in testing may also feed discriminatory attitudes toward peo-
ple with certain behavioral traits, such as homosexuality, if parents 
in the future are able to test to avoid those traits.5 The question 
                                                                                                                    
 1. As Paul Lombardo asked at the beginning of the conference and in the opening ar-
ticle of this issue, three generations of (what) is enough? Reformulating Justice Holmes’s 
notorious statement in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), that “three generations of imbe-
ciles are enough,” id. at 207, Lombardo states that if there are good eugenic practices, then 
we need to figure out what kinds of conditions we are trying to avoid. See Paul A. 
Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of ??? Are Enough?, 30 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 191, 217-18 (2003). 
 2. See Adrienne Asch, Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or 
Compatible?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 315, 339-42 (2003). “[C]reating an official list of condi-
tions that parents should worry about will have an undesirable effect on the societal accep-
tance and self-esteem of those with the listed conditions.” Id. at 339.  
 3. Id. at 340. 
 4. See David Wasserman, A Choice of Evils in Prenatal Testing, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 295 passim (2003) (preferring a regime of unrestricted choice to one that limits test-
ing for only certain conditions even at the risk of such harms to the parent-child relation-
ship because of the moral conviction “that the tendency to stigmatize physical and mental 
difference abnormality is deeply engrained and recalcitrant, whereas the tendency to treat 
children as commodities will be largely offset by the transformative effect of actually rais-
ing them.” Id. at 313).  
 5. See Suzanne Holland, Selecting Against Difference: Assisted Reproduction, Dis-
ability and Regulation, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401, 402-03 (2003). 
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whether a line should be drawn between appropriate and inappro-
priate uses of testing and, if a line should be drawn, where it should 
be drawn and by whom,6 are complex issues that receive thoughtful 
analysis in a number of the articles in this issue.7 
 Another, less anticipated theme that emerges from the pieces in 
this issue is the inherently social nature of genetic health and the 
challenge that medicine’s uses of genetic information pose for the 
preeminence of individual autonomy as a principle in bioethical rea-
soning. As one author points out: “genetic health is the ultimate no-
tion of a relational concept of health because . . . [it] always involves 
a social unit.”8 In other words, no man or woman is a genetic island, 
and we cannot escape the implications of our genetic connections—to 
those who have come before us and those who will come after us, to 
the mate with whom we plan to mingle genetic material in reproduc-
tion, and to those with whom we simply share certain genetic 
traits—in making decisions regarding the use of genetic informa-
tion.9 Moreover, beyond their obvious impact on our children and po-
tential children, our choices about whether and how to use genetic in-
formation in reproductive decision making should also be made with 
a consciousness of our responsibility to the broader community those 
decisions may affect.10 Thus, we are challenged to exercise our repro-
ductive autonomy with a sense of social responsibility. At the same 
time, however, individuals’ “autonomy” with respect to whether and 
how to use prenatal genetic testing may be seriously—if not obvi-
ously—constrained by the social and medical context in which the 
tests are developed and offered.11 While the broader debates over 
                                                                                                                    
 6. See Jeffrey R. Botkin, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 265, 287-92 (2003) (proposing a standard of the welfare of the parents). 
 7. John Jacobi’s article discusses a different sort of line-drawing issue. Recently en-
acted state statutes that prohibit discrimination by health insurers on the basis of genetic 
information appear to be premised at least in part on the notion that one cannot be at fault 
for one’s genetic make-up and therefore should not be denied health insurance on that ba-
sis. Drawing a line around genetic conditions to grant them exceptional treatment for this 
reason, however, would appear to be under-inclusive, for most illnesses are not attribut-
able to the fault of a person’s behavior. See John V. Jacobi, Genetic Discrimination in a 
Time of False Hopes, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 391-94 (2003). 
 8. Larry I. Palmer, Genetic Health and Eugenics Precedents: A Voice of Caution, 30 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 237, 237 (2003). 
 9. Cf. Mary B. Mahowald, Aren’t We All Eugenicists? Commentary on Paul 
Lombardo’s “Taking Eugenics Seriously,” 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 219, 224 n.22 (2003) (ar-
ticulating concept of “relational autonomy” which suggests that “our ongoing relationships 
to others are inseparable from our autonomous decisions”). 
 10. See Janet Dolgin, The Ideological Context of the Disability Rights Critique: Where 
Modernity and Tradition Meet, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 343, 357 (2003) (characterizing dis-
ability rights critique of prenatal genetic testing as “valu[ing] choice but [being] cognizant 
of the risk of sacrificing communal responsibility to individual preference”); Holland, supra 
note 5, at 404 (asserting that the right of reproduction is bounded by social obligations, in-
cluding that to vulnerable populations). 
 11. See Asch, supra note 2, at 334-35 (linking continuing discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities and the development and funding of, and professional encourage-
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abortion generally involve a tension between the individual auton-
omy to choose abortion and legal constraints limiting that autonomy, 
in the realm of prenatal genetic testing and termination, the tension 
is between social forces encouraging abortion of fetuses who would be 
disabled if born and the prospective parent’s autonomy to avoid test-
ing and abortion. These social forces are far more elusive than legal 
constraints and have received too little attention. Finally, another 
aspect of the social nature of genetic information emerges when we 
consider the potential use of genetic information by health insurance 
underwriters.12 The widespread sense that it is inherently unfair to 
exclude a person from health insurance coverage because of a genetic 
trait may ultimately prompt a more profound recognition of the need 
to treat health insurance as a mechanism of social solidarity, and not 
merely an individual prepayment mechanism.  
 Related to these two themes that emerged during the confer-
ence—line drawing and the social nature of genetic information—is 
another issue that we believe worthy of mention, an issue that re-
ceived considerable attention during the discussion and debate that 
took place during the conference but that is not reflected in the pub-
lished articles to the same degree. When Paul Lombardo opened the 
conference with discussion of the Buck v. Bell13 case and the histori-
cal context in which it arose, he asked (paralleling the words of 
Holmes’s infamous opinion), if there are good eugenic practices, then 
what kinds of conditions are we trying to avoid? Three generations of 
____ is enough? Mary Mahowald turned the question around at the 
end of her talk—and told the audience that three generations of men-
tal retardation were not enough. This provocative statement ques-
tioned the wisdom and ethics of one of the most common uses of pre-
natal testing—the testing of fetuses for Down syndrome, with the ex-
pectation that selective abortion may follow. One of the most inter-
esting developments at the conference, however, was that the state-
ment was generally embraced. There appeared to be general consen-
sus among participants that societal and institutional encourage-
ment of the prenatal genetic diagnosis of fetuses with Down syn-
drome for the purpose of avoiding the births of such children is not 
“good eugenics.” In addition, while the emphasis was on the social 
context in which such testing and selection take place, rather than on 
the individual decisions of potential parents, there was also general 
recognition that even the latter was morally problematic.  
 The concerns that were expressed about such common testing and 
selection practices were many and varied. Modern selection practices 
against Down syndrome parallel in some disturbing ways universally 
condemned eugenic practices of the past aimed at eliminating mental 
                                                                                                                    
ment to use, prenatal genetic tests); Mahowald, supra note 9, at 224 (acknowledging the 
coercive effect of “economic costs and social pressures”). 
 12. See Jacobi, supra note 7. 
 13. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
  xv
retardation. While the means of such elimination differ greatly from 
the involuntary euthanasia programs of Nazi Germany or the state 
sterilization programs in the United States, the goals are hauntingly 
similar. Furthermore, to the extent such selection practices may ap-
pear to be based upon more laudable impulses to avoid suffering 
(rather than, for example, to relieve society of the economic burdens 
of caring for people with mental retardation), assumptions about the 
suffering of children with mental retardation should more honestly 
be understood as involving concerns about the ability to live inde-
pendently. Much of participants’ objection to the widespread practice 
of aborting fetuses with Down syndrome stemmed from a criticism of 
the overvaluation within modern American society of “ableism” and 
the capability to be independent of others’ care, or, to put it another 
way, to our society’s inhospitability to disability and dependency. Fi-
nally, the social and medical contexts in which decisions regarding 
testing for Down syndrome are made led many to question whether 
prospective parents’ choices reflect an exercise of true autonomy.  
 To the extent one concludes that genetic testing and selection to 
avoid Down syndrome shares disturbing characteristics with “bad 
eugenics” (as many participants in the conference appeared to agree), 
then what are the implications of this assessment? For government, 
for individuals, for society? First, there was no suggestion at the con-
ference that the state should prohibit individuals from engaging in 
prenatal testing and selection. The autonomy of individual prospec-
tive parents in this regard was clearly favored over any actions the 
state might take in terms of barring testing and/or abortion. As Mary 
Mahowald pointed out, it was government action (although in the 
other direction) that made past eugenic programs so objectionable. 
Just as there was no suggestion that the government should bar pre-
natal testing and selective abortion for mental retardation, there was 
reluctance among participants to condemn individuals for deciding to 
test or to abort. Rather there was sympathy for prospective parents 
facing choices that formerly did not exist. Given that participants 
were not willing to say that parental choices should be limited or 
even condemned, the course that appeared most conducive to re-
sponding to the concerns about selection practices against Down syn-
drome was to change the social and medical context in which these 
decisions are made—among other things, to provide more social wel-
come for children with mental retardation and to appropriately edu-
cate prospective parents about the fulfilling lives such children can 
lead.  
 It seems indeed remarkable that scholars from such diverse back-
grounds and experiences reached some degree of agreement regard-
ing the problematic nature of society’s encouragement of prenatal 
testing for Down syndrome. Lest this be taken as an indication that 
it will be easy to achieve consensus on the numerous issues posed by 
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increases in genetic knowledge, however, we hasten to note that legal 
views on the appropriate use of prenatal genetic information and the 
apportionment of social versus individual responsibility for any bur-
dens associated with genetic difference remain remarkably diver-
gent. Several examples of this divergence appeared in the months fol-
lowing the conference and preceding the publication of this issue. In 
October 2002, a prominent law review published an article in which 
the author posed the question “Who should pay for bad genes?” and 
suggested that it would be unfair to require society to pay any costs 
associated with a child’s “bad genes” if the child’s parents could have 
avoided the genetic condition.14 This view, which suggests that par-
ents should shoulder the economic costs of raising a child with an 
avoidable genetic condition, would seem to encourage parents to de-
tect, if possible, and then select against disabling conditions. Only a 
few months later, though, an English court found that prospective 
parents were not allowed, under Britain’s Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act, to engage in preimplantation genetic diagnosis of an 
embryo.15 Thus, English law appears to prohibit the very type of pre-
implantation selection that the law review article suggests is desir-
able. Finally, on New Year’s Eve 2002, the Utah Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting wrongful birth 
causes of action, finding that the inability to hold a physician legally 
liable for failing to advise prospective parents regarding genetic risks 
and testing options does not substantially burden a woman’s consti-
tutionally protected right to choose to terminate a pregnancy.16 So in 
Utah, prospective parents have no legally protected right to receive 
competent advising about genetic risks and testing for genetic condi-
tions. 
 Perhaps what the juxtaposition of these divergent views in the le-
gal system with the degree of consensus that conference participants 
achieved suggests is the value of dialogue on the ethically appropri-
ate use of genetic information. A central goal of the conference was to 
include voices of those with first-hand experience of disability, 
whether it be the voice of a person with a disability, a person with a 
disabled family member, a person who has experienced a “social 
handicap” or one who has worked with and advocated for persons 
with disabilities. Too often our legal and social conversations about 
the uses of genetic information have not invited the participation of 
these voices, but the level of discourse and agreement that occurred 
                                                                                                                    
 14. See Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1345 (2002). 
 15. Quintavalle v. Human Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., No. CO/1162/02, 2002 
WL 31676428 (QB Dec. 3, 2002). This case involved parents who sought to engage in tissue 
typing of an embryo in order to determine whether the embryo would produce a child who 
would be a suitable stem cell donor for a sibling with beta thalassaemia. Id. The court sug-
gested, without holding, however, that preimplantation genetic diagnosis for the more gen-
eral purpose of selecting genetic traits would also be prohibited by the HFEA. See id. 
 16. Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., No. 20000827, 2002 WL 31895671 (Utah Dec. 31, 
2002). 
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at the conference indicate the value of respectful listening and dia-
logue. 
 
 Here are the voices to which you can listen in this issue. 
 
 In Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of ??? Are 
Enough?,17 Paul Lombardo, a law professor and historian who has 
studied extensively the history behind the Supreme Court’s notorious 
decision in Buck v. Bell,18 places the questions addressed by confer-
ence participants in an historical context. In this opening piece of the 
issue, Lombardo chronicles the media’s recent coverage of genetics, 
coverage that has related both to the culmination of efforts to se-
quence the human genome and to the State of Virginia’s legislative 
resolution expressing “profound regret” for state-sponsored eugenics 
policies in the early twentieth century.19 This review highlights the 
curious juxtaposition of contemporary scientific, medical and popular 
enthusiasm regarding the recent mapping of the human genome with 
the general opprobrium our society attaches to one of the forebears of 
genetic medicine, namely the early twentieth-century eugenics move-
ment. Lombardo describes the efforts of several early adherents of 
the eugenics movement. His description reveals that while some 
supported coercive interventions to limit the personal freedoms of 
disabled persons—such as laws supporting the “sequestration or . . . 
sterilization” of persons with hereditary blindness20—other support-
ers advocated genetic education as a means of improving health and 
preventing hereditary disease and disability. Thus, even in the early 
twentieth century, the “ambivalence of a brand of eugenics that was 
simultaneously sympathetic to the disabled and intent on eradicating 
disabilities” was apparent.21 Ultimately, Lombardo reminds us that 
today’s pursuit of advances in genetic medicine has too much in 
common with the eugenics movement—both in terms of motive and 
method—for us to dismiss the lessons of its history. 
 In Aren’t We All Eugenicists? Commentary on Paul Lombardo’s 
“Taking Eugenics Seriously,”22 Mary Mahowald, a philosopher who 
has previously examined from a feminist perspective the issues that 
genetics pose for equality, uses Lombardo’s article as a springboard 
for analyzing how to distinguish those eugenic practices that are 
morally objectionable from those practices that may be morally neu-
tral or even praiseworthy. Mahowald notes that the negative moral 
connotation attached today to the term “eugenics” is associated with 
                                                                                                                    
 17. Lombardo, supra note 1. 
 18. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
 19. Lombardo, supra note 1, at 192-202. 
 20. Id. at 205. 
 21. Id. at 213. 
 22. Mahowald, supra note 9. 
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the coercive nature of past eugenic practices, but she emphasizes 
that coercion is not an inherent aspect of “eugenics,” which etymol-
ogically derives from the Greek for “well born.”23 By identifying the 
characteristics of an example of clearly morally reprehensible eugen-
ics (Nazi genocide) and an example of clearly praiseworthy eugenic 
behavior (the health-promoting practices of most pregnant women), 
Mahowald constructs a framework for assessing the ethical accept-
ability of practices, such as prenatal genetic testing, that fall some-
where on the spectrum between these extremes. This framework in-
cludes, among other elements, examination of whether eugenic deci-
sions are autonomously made by prospective parents or are somehow 
coerced and whether decisions seek to avoid a specific trait or instead 
seek to promote health. Specifically, Mahowald examines the widely 
socially accepted practice of prenatal testing and termination for 
Down syndrome, and concludes that the existing social support for 
the termination of fetuses because they would be mentally retarded 
illustrates an example of bad eugenics.24 
 Larry Palmer, a law professor known for his application of an in-
stitutional perspective to questions of law and medicine, also looks to 
history for guidance in developing new theories of liability applicable 
to genetic health. In Genetic Health and Eugenics Precedents: A Voice 
of Caution,25 Palmer looks to the “eugenic precedents” of the Nazi 
Doctors’ trial at Nuremburg and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and, 
while rejecting their usefulness as technical legal precedents, draws 
from them institutional lessons about ethical reasoning regarding 
the modern disease management process.26 In part, these lessons in-
volve how genetically (and often ethnically or geographically) linked 
groups can participate in genetic research and efforts to prevent ge-
netic disability. According to Palmer, these lessons regarding ethical 
reasoning from the eugenic precedents should be combined with the 
legal reasoning in existing genetic health (i.e., wrongful birth and 
wrongful life) cases to develop a theory of liability for modern disease 
management.27 Ultimately, he advocates for the development of a li-
ability theory that recognizes the parameters of genetic medicine as 
going beyond the traditional doctor-patient dyad and thus implicat-
ing a public health perspective on improving the health of groups. 
 Jeffrey Botkin, a professor of pediatrics and genetics, returns in 
his article to the question of the ethical appropriateness of prenatal 
genetic diagnosis and the selection of children, and raises the specific 
question of whether some limits should be placed on what genetic in-
formation about a fetus or embryo should be offered to prospective 
parents. Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children28 adopts a 
                                                                                                                    
 23. Id. at 223-24. 
 24. Id. at 233-34. 
 25. Palmer, supra note 8. 
 26. Id. at 242. 
 27. Id. at 243. 
 28. Botkin, supra note 6. 
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medical professional’s perspective and poses the question: “What 
tests should an ethical practitioner provide?”29 After examining 
wrongful birth and wrongful life actions as setting a minimum stan-
dard of risk communication, Botkin acknowledges but ultimately re-
jects proposals that practitioners provide prospective parents with 
risk information for all genetic conditions or traits for which testing 
is available. Botkin views such a comprehensive standard as posing 
logistical challenges for how such large amounts of complex informa-
tion could be managed, as failing to distinguish between what infor-
mation is ethically desirable and what is legally mandatory, and as 
being potentially harmful to the community of persons with disabili-
ties. By contrast, he advocates an approach by which professional 
standards—rather than law or regulation—would determine what in-
formation and tests should be offered to parents, with the guiding 
principle being that only conditions often resulting in tangible harms 
to parents should be the subject of genetic counseling.30 According to 
Botkin, a genetic condition carrying a risk of an adult-onset disorder 
would not meet this standard (and thus should not be tested for pre-
natally), while a genetic condition associated with significant disabil-
ity beginning in childhood would. 
 David Wasserman comes to a conclusion different from Botkin’s 
on the question of whether a line should be drawn between “testable” 
and “nontestable” conditions in the context of prenatal genetic diag-
nosis. Wasserman, who has written extensively on issues relating to 
disability, begins his article, A Choice of Evils in Prenatal Testing,31 
by challenging the conventional understanding of prenatal testing as 
a medical procedure and depicting it instead as typically a procedure 
to identify and destroy unwanted organisms.32 Arguing that termina-
tion based on disability is not easily distinguishable from sex-
selection abortion (in that neither practice typically serves to pro-
mote the health of an individual), Wasserman concedes that allowing 
testing and selection for a wide range of genetic traits may act to de-
grade the parent-child relationship and commodify children. None-
theless, he views these possible harms as preferable to the further 
stigmatization of impairment likely to flow from the identification of 
only certain impairments as bad enough to test for. Moreover, he 
questions whether a professional standard for testing that focuses on 
family harm or burdens would be capable of drawing a clear line be-
tween testable and nontestable conditions, since questions of family 
harm depend not only on a particular family’s reaction to a genetic 
condition, but also on the contingent nature of social arrangements 
contributing to those burdens. Thus, his article concludes that a re-
                                                                                                                    
 29. Id. at 265-66. 
 30. Id. at 288. 
 31. Wasserman, supra note 4. 
 32. Id. at 297. 
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gime of unrestricted testing represents the lesser of two evils because 
it may “mut[e] the expressive significance of prenatal testing for peo-
ple with disabilities.”33 
 In Disability Equality and Prenatal Testing: Contradictory or 
Compatible?,34 Adrienne Asch, well known for her influential work 
within the disability rights critique of prenatal testing, asks whether 
it is possible for society to pursue the goal of social inclusion of per-
sons with disabilities alongside the promotion of prenatal selection to 
avoid disabilities. She answers that these two pursuits are inher-
ently in conflict, that assumptions that underlie the social endorse-
ment of prenatal selection—assumptions (which she critiques as un-
informed and narrowly conceived) about the quality of life of people 
born with disabilities—undermine the welcome of people with dis-
abilities that laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act pur-
port to provide. The necessary, if unintended, consequences of insti-
tutional promotion of prenatal selection against disabilities are a de-
valuation of the lives of persons who live now and will live in the fu-
ture with disabilities35 and an intrusion into the reproductive choices 
of women who will find it difficult to bring a child into the world 
knowing that society believes that the births of such children should 
have been prevented.36  
 In examining the assumptions that surround the promotion of 
prenatal screening, Asch tackles a central question posed by propo-
nents to justify institutional support of prenatal screening practices, 
which is this: isn’t it better not to have a disability than to have one, 
and that being so, isn’t it better to bring a child into the world who 
doesn’t have a disability than a child who has one? The answer, for 
Asch, is not self-evident, and her analysis rejects the presumptive re-
sponses to both parts of the question. First she points out the degree 
to which people with disabilities are often disadvantaged more by 
discriminatory attitudes and practices than by intrinsic limitations 
caused by their disability.37 Drawing on the social and minority group 
models of disability, Asch points out that most people with prenatally 
detectable disabilities are not hindered from leading fulfilling lives 
merely by virtue of the characteristics that distinguish them from 
people without disabilities. Assumptions to the contrary are misin-
formed. Asch then directly addresses the question of the good of hav-
ing a capacity and the presumptive bad of not having it. Having a 
capacity may be good, she writes, “but the absence of capacity is 
[simply] not having it.”38 It is not, for one thing, a “loss” (as might be 
experienced by someone who had a capacity, but lost it), nor is it nec-
essarily an absence of something of intrinsic value, as opposed to a 
                                                                                                                    
 33. Id. at 300. 
 34. Asch, supra note 2. 
 35. Id. at 316-17. 
 36. Id. at 340. 
 37. Id. at 319-22. 
 38. Id. at 326. 
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“means to an end”—as visual capacity is a means to (but not the only 
means to) aesthetic pleasure.39 People can lead fulfilling lives without 
the full panoply of species-typical capacities.40 She writes, “[b]rief ac-
quaintance with people who have disabilities and who work, play, 
study, love, and enjoy the world should demonstrate that very few 
conditions preclude participating in the basic activities of life, even if 
some conditions limit some classes of them, or methods of engaging 
in them.”41 Finally, Asch describes recent debates concerning 
whether prospective parents should be limited in their selection of 
the traits they might choose for their children, whether they should 
be allowed, for example, to select against blindness but not against 
color-blindness, against deafness but not against tone deafness—the 
latter traits in these pairs being viewed by society as trivial incapaci-
ties, the former being considered serious enough to warrant avoid-
ance through selection. Asch counsels against any such “line draw-
ing”: the construction of such a list sends a demeaning message to 
people living with the listed conditions and creates a value-laden 
counseling environment in an arena where reproductive choice has, 
at least in theory, been valued.  
 Janet Dolgin has written extensively on legal and social aspects of 
reproduction and family. Her article in this issue, The Ideological 
Context of the Disability Rights Critique: Where Modernity and Tra-
dition Meet,42 is also centered on the disability rights critique of 
prenatal testing. But rather than discussing the strength of various 
claims made by adherents and opponents of the critique, she evalu-
ates it as presenting a model of discourse outside legal and political 
contexts that might suggest new and valuable ways of discussing 
abortion and the scope and meaning of family more generally. Dolgin 
begins by pointing out that while most proponents of the disability 
rights critique are pro-choice—meaning that they remain committed 
to a woman’s legal right to an abortion—they nevertheless decry the 
social and institutional culture in which choices are made to avoid 
the births of children with disabilities. The choice to abort a fetus 
should be legally protected, but when the choice is made because of 
prenatally diagnosed disabilities, that choice is morally problematic. 
Because these concerns about choices made on the basis of the char-
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acteristics of the child who will be born cannot be addressed within 
the existing framework of abortion law—which focuses on the indi-
vidual autonomy rights of the woman, on the one hand, as balanced 
against concerns about the ontological status of the fetus, on the 
other—the critique has been discussed and debated outside legal and 
political contexts. In this regard the critique has offered what is typi-
cally missing from discourse about abortion in general: it has offered 
a commitment to both individual autonomy and to community—in 
particular, the community of people with disabilities. It has merged 
and valued arguments (as to unrestricted choice and restricted 
choice) that as more generally applied to the abortion debate appear 
polarized. For this reason, Dolgin sees the critique as offering an “al-
ternative frame for discourse”43 that suggests that opponents in the 
abortion debate may be more open to mediation than has been sup-
posed. Just as within the disability rights critique itself, those who 
identify as pro-life and those who identify as pro-choice value to some 
degree both choice and community; an abortion discourse that takes 
place outside the context of courts and politics may reveal the degree 
to which there exist shared understandings between pro-life and pro-
choice groups. 
 Suzanne Holland offers a unique perspective within this issue on 
the matter of prenatal selection of fetuses and embryos. As a profes-
sor of religious and social ethics, she draws on philosophical sources 
rather than legal ones. As a “homosexual person in a deeply hetero-
normative culture,”44 as she describes herself at one point in the arti-
cle, she places herself quite personally as having deep and compel-
ling interests in the future of genetic selection for undesirable traits. 
The focus of her article is on behavioral characteristics that might be 
selected against as “handicapping” (such as intelligence, alcoholism, 
aggression, homosexuality)45 although the points she makes are also 
applicable to people with disabilities as we commonly understand 
them. Since both types of characteristics are socially constructed as 
negative, the analysis applies similarly. Holland argues that repro-
duction is not an unbounded right, but carries social obligations, one 
of which is to support vulnerable members of society. What this 
means in the context of practices of genetic selection is that we must 
first listen to people who have reason to fear that, technology permit-
ting, they might not have been born. In Holland’s view, the knowl-
edge such people have achieved through their experiences must be 
appreciated and brought to bear on the practices and future regula-
tion of assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). Holland does not, 
however, leave her suggestions for reform of current practices of 
ARTs at this procedural level. Relying on Martha Nussbaum’s work 
identifying human capabilities and the obligation of a good society to 
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promote them, Holland identifies a substantive responsibility on the 
part of American society: to discourage any future practice of select-
ing against behavioral traits. Such selection runs counter to society’s 
obligation to provide for all persons to flourish, whether “differently 
abled or stigmatized with social handicaps.”46 
 John Jacobi, an expert in health insurance finance and regulation, 
takes a look at the intersection of genes and disability in the context 
of health insurance in his article, Genetic Discrimination in a Time of 
False Hopes.47 He notes that although genetic discrimination laws 
were widely adopted by states in the 1990s, revealing broad support 
for “genetic equity” in health insurance, this country’s commitment 
to such antidiscrimination principles remain uncertain. First, the 
laws were adopted in anticipation of insurers using genetic informa-
tion to classify risk, but before they have done so. Such laws have 
therefore remained largely untested. When the science advances to a 
point that genetic information is actually predictive of future illness, 
insurers will find it relevant for risk classification, and the strength 
of those statutes will be tested. Jacobi argues that for the promise of 
genetic equity contained in those statutes to be realized, they must 
be drafted (re-drafted) to avoid ambiguity of the sort that has met 
narrowed interpretation in the disability context under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act and they must be adequately enforced 
against covert discrimination practices through the use of consumer 
protection devices now being developed to protect consumers from 
some of the more unsavory practices of managed care organizations.  
 The commitment to genetic equity in health insurance faces an-
other threat, however, which is the renewal of rapidly rising health 
care costs. Rationing in some form, Jacobi tells us, is inevitable.48 But 
it should not take the form of favoring established treatments over 
new ones and treatments valued by the majority over those valued by 
the minority.49 Such historical tendencies would unfairly disadvan-
tage people with disabilities and people with expensive genetic condi-
tions. In this vein, Jacobi suggests the impropriety of Daniel Calla-
han’s much-discussed proposition to ration on the basis of “sustain-
able medicine,” one goal of which is “a decent level of physical and 
mental competence” and “limited aspirations for progress and tech-
nological innovation.”50 Such a system would run counter to the egali-
tarian principles rooted in the disability rights history51 and should 
health insurance system has been incrementally been moving.52 
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